WWII, the Cold War and the Korean War
Theory, Doctrine, Objective, Strategy

- Theory
- Doctrine
- Objective
- Strategy
- History
- Simulations & Exercises
- Conflict
Overview

- World War II
- Early Cold War
- Korean War
Who were the prominent airpower theorists?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• City busting</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Bomb the people … break their will</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Morale is a center of gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Need air superiority</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Independent Air Force</td>
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| • Industrial web -- bomb means of war |
| • Air power commanded by Airmen |
| • First Expeditionary Air Force – St. Mihiel |
| • Need air superiority |
| • Independent Air Force |
What role did ACTS and AWPD-1 play in forming our initial airpower doctrine?

- Hi-Alt Precision Day Bombing
- Strategic bombardment
  - Industrial/Economic systems
- Bomber will always get through
- The Germany Plan
  - 6,860 bombers
  - 2,160,000 personnel
  - 6 months = victory
Objective

What were US objectives in Europe?

• **Grand Allied Strategy**
  – Unconditional surrender
  – Germany first
  – Start in North Africa
  – Strategic bombing
  – Limit Pacific activities
  – Channel invasion
What was the initial European Theater airpower strategy?

How well did this initial concept work?
Doctrine

- **AWPD-42**
  - Change in doctrinal thinking
  - Bomber does not always get through
  - Air Superiority is key
Doctrine

How did airpower doctrine in the Pacific differ from Europe?
Objective

Objectives in the Pacific?

- **Grand Allied Strategy**
  - Germany first, then Japan
  - Unconditional surrender
What airpower strategy was employed?

- Island hopping campaign
- Area bombing
- Strategic interdiction of Japan
- Centralized control
- Atomic bomb
We have grasped the mystery of the atom . . . . The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living.

General Omar Bradley
“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.”
Theory

- Iron Curtain -- bi-polar worldview
  - US vs USSR
  - Democracy vs Communism
- WW III
  - Would be fought in Europe
  - Use of nuclear weapons inevitable
Doctrine

- FM 100-20: *Command/Employment of Airpower*
  - Based on experiences in North Africa

- AF’s declaration of independence

- Land and air coequal and interdependent
  - Departure from FM 31-35

- Air superiority first requirement

- Airpower must be commanded by Airmen
Objective

What were US post-WWII objectives?

• Truman Doctrine - Soviet containment
  • NSC-68 - Paul Nitze
• Marshall Plan - Europe’s economic recovery
• Keep the Cold War Cold - prevent WWII
Strategy

- Berlin Airlift, Jun 48-Sep 49
  - Saved Berlin
  - Demonstrated resolve
  - Specific air routes avoided escalation
Strategy

- Reconnaissance/Surveillance
  - Cost = 78 Airmen and 10 aircraft
- Develop nuclear bomber and ICBM force
- Forward basing
Long logistical lines
Lack of heavy airlift
NATO v. Warsaw Pact
1,400 bases/31 countries
What were the prevailing theories influencing Korean War doctrine?

- **Conflict = escalation to World War III**
  - Aggression must be checked (credibility)

- **Europe would be the main theater**
  - Korea as possible diversion
  - Limited resources
Doctrine

• Guiding doctrine was FM 100-20
• Force and organization design
  • SAC and strategic bombardment
  • Jet age
Objective

What were the US objectives?

• Jun 50: Status Quo Ante
  – Repel invaders
  – Restore 38th parallel

• Oct 50: Unite peninsula
  – Northeast Asian security

• Jan 51: Status Quo Ante
  – Chinese intervention
Red China is not a powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the JCS, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy.

**Strategy**

- Limited war (Europe was key)
- Tactical vs strategic airpower
- Couldn’t bomb source (China)
- Limited targets
- Modern systems unused
  - B-29s vs B-36
  - F-51 / Twin Mustang, F-80
  - F-86 comes on-line later

![Map of MIG Alley](image)
Summary

- World War II
- Early Cold War
- Korean War
The Vietnam War
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Overview

Vietnam War

• Theory and Doctrine
• Objectives
• Contextual Elements
• Operational Elements
• Strategies
• Lessons Learned
Theory

What were the prevailing airpower theories prior to the Vietnam War?

- Airpower Combined With Nuclear Weapons Appeared to be the Way to Fight Wars
- Preparation for “General War” Would Suffice to Win Any Limited War
- Technological Superiority Will Bend the Enemy to Our Will
Doctrine

How were the prevailing theories translated into doctrine?

- Aircrew Training Concentrated on Nuclear Weapon Delivery
- No Provision For non-Nuclear Strategic Bombing
Doctrine

**AFM 1-1 (1964)**
- Focused on Deterrence
  - Nukes could deter all levels of conflict
- Introduced Flexible Response
  - National leaders decide best use of forces

**SAC Training Manuals**
- Focused on strategic bombing and nuclear weapons delivery
Johnson Administration Objectives

• Independent, non-Communist South Vietnam
• Prevent Chinese and Soviet Participation and Possible Escalation - WWII
• Persuade North Vietnamese to Desist by Convincing Them They Could Not Win
• Not Allow Vietnam War to Eclipse Great Society Programs
What airpower strategy was used to accomplish the Johnson Administration objectives?
Strategy

ROLLING THUNDER (Mar ’65 – Nov ’68)

• Strategic bombing and interdiction
  • Railroad chokepoints, bridges, roads, ammo depots, petroleum storage, power production

• Gradual increase in bombing intensity

• Restrictions on # of sorties, targets, and weapons loads
Strategy

Why is ROLLING THUNDER considered an ineffective campaign?

- Failed to Accomplish Objectives
  - Conventional airpower applied in an unconventional war
  - Concentrated on severing north Vietnamese support
    - Supply interruptions, destruction of fuel depots, etc., had little impact on Viet Cong
  - Mirror imaging
1968: Dramatic Year

- Siege at Khe Sahn
- Tet Offensive
- Cronkite’s view
- LBJ Withdraws
- MLK Assassinated
- RFK Assassinated
- Nixon Elected
Nixon Administration Objectives

Vietnamization-US Withdrawal

• US Opted for “No-Win” Situation
• “Peace With Honor”--Willing to Exit Without a Total Victory for South Vietnam
Strategy

What strategies were used to accomplish the Nixon Administration objectives?
Strategy

LINEBACKER I (May ’72 - Oct ’72)
• Strategic bombing and interdiction
  • Mined Haiphong Harbor, bombed railroad yards, highways, bridges, POL depots, power plants, war-related resources
  • Electro-optical and laser guided bombs
Strategy

LINEBACKER II (Dec 18-29, ’72)

• Strategic Bombing
  • Struck Targets In and Around North Vietnam’s 10 Major Cities
  • Depleted N.V. Air Defenses
  • SAM Sites, Rail Yards, Supply Depots, Petroleum Storage Facilities, Power Production Plants, Civilian Morale
Why are the LINEBACKER operations considered effective campaigns?
Strategy

• Accomplished objectives
  • **LINEBACKER I**
    • Stopped the 1972 Spring Offensive
    • Brought North Vietnam to peace talks
  • **LINEBACKER II**
    • Returned North Vietnam to peace talks
    • Paved the way for total US withdrawal

Conventional Airpower vs Conventional Forces
SUMMARY

Vietnam War

- Theory and Doctrine
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- Contextual Elements
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- Strategies
- Lessons Learned
The Inter-War Years

• Small regional conflicts
  • Operation EAGLE CLAW
  • Operation URGENT FURY
  • Operation EL DORADO CANYON

• Shortfalls / failures in theory and doctrine
The Inter-War Years

Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)

- Directed Services to fight as Joint Team
- Removed Service Chiefs from combat chain-of-command
- Joint Chiefs of Staff placed in Advisor roles
- Air Force coordinates on first Joint Doctrine, but …

Army Doctrine Took Lead in Determining Role of Airpower
Theory

What were the prevailing airpower theories prior to the Gulf War?
Doctrine

How were these theories translated into doctrine?

- **AirLand Battle Doctrine**
  - Focused on fighting Soviets in Europe
  - Fulda Gap
  - No provisions for independent air campaign using conventional weapons against non-Soviet enemy
    - Stuck in strategic/tactical stovepipes
Doctrine

The Fulda Gap

8th GUARDS ARMY

VII Corps
Doctrine

AFM 1-1 (1984)

- AF has primary responsibility for maintaining US’ freedom to act throughout the aerospace environment
- Establish one authority for air defense and airspace control
- Missions: Strategic Aerospace Offense/Defense, Counterair, Air Interdiction, CAS, Special Ops, Airlift, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Maritime Ops
End of the Cold War
The Gulf War
Overview

Operation DESERT STORM

• Contextual & Operational Elements
• Objectives
• Strategy
• Lessons Learned
Objectives

1. Immediate, Complete, and Unconditional Withdrawal of Iraqi Forces From Kuwait

2. Restoration of Kuwait’s Legitimate Government


4. Safety and Protection of American Citizens Abroad

* Iraqi disposition of forces in Kuwait on 6 August 1990. Regular army divisions were arriving from garrisons in Iraq, freeing Republican Guard units for further employment.
Strategy

Strategic Bombing

• Major shift from AirLand Battle Doctrine
• Target War-Making Capacity/Enemy Morale
  • ‘Mitchellessque’ Warfare
• Target Centers of Gravity
• Conduct Parallel Warfare
Lessons Learned

• Doctrine Was Updated (Joint and AF)
  • Integrated Strategic & Tactical Airpower
  • Leveraged Technology (Stealth, PGMs, Space)
• Major Reorganization (AF Transformation)
• Airpower Emerges as “Go-To” Force (Operation DELIBERATE FORCE and ALLIED FORCE, Operation DESERT FOX.)
  • Emergence of “Clinton Doctrine”
Summary

Operation DESERT STORM

• Inter-War Years
• Pre-Gulf War Theory and Doctrine
• Contextual Elements
• Operational Elements
• Objectives and Strategy
• Lessons Learned
The Post-Gulf War World and Airpower Development

The Rise of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- Persistence as the new paradigm
- Autonomy vs. Accountability

The Essentiality of Precision
- The ‘CNN Effect’
- Precision makes war ‘affordable’

The Value of Stealth (?)

The Promise of Directed Energy (?)
The Post-Gulf War World and Airpower Development (Cont’d)

Net-centric Warfare
- The creation of virtual battlespaces
  - Bandwidth as King
  - Intelligence as Queen

The Proliferation of Non-State Actors

The Threat of Climate Change